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Equal Representation and the Weighted Voting
Alternative
Only seven years ago, the Supreme Court held for the first time that
the reapportionment' of a legislature is a justiciable issue.2 Since then,
the Court has applied its evolving standards for reapportionment not
only to Congressional districts 3 but to both houses of the state legis-
latures4 and, most recently, to local bodies which exercise "general
governmental powers over an entire geographical area."
Elected officials at each of these political levels have objected to the
only plan of reapportionment which the Supreme Court has clearly
held constitutional-single-member districts of equal population-
because it requires constant redistricting, a process which is expensive,
time-consuming and disruptive of the constituencies among whom
they have successfully campaigned.,
This Note analyzes weighted voting, which legislators find the most
attractive of the plans proposed as alternatives because it eliminates
the need for redistricting and because, in mathematically refined form,
it has been held constitutional several times in the state courts.
I.
In the earlier reapportionment decisions after Baker v. Carr the
Supreme Court spoke of ensuring that "one man's vote . .. is to be
worth as much as another's." It was left ambiguous whether this
phrase meant that all voters should have an equal chance to determine
1. The term "re-apportionment," though properly denoting the "determination upon
each decennial census of the number of representatives which each state -;all elect,"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (4th ed. 1951), has come to be synonymous with "re-district-
ing," the actual drawing of lines to establish electoral areas. Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F.
Supp. 404, 410 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1966) re,'d sub. nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
In this Note, the two terms are used interchangeably to indicate the process of delimiting
electoral districts.
2. Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
6. Challenges through litigation magnify these problems. Litigation concerning re-
districting in New Yorks Westchester County, for example, has been in the State courts
no fewer than nine times in the past three years. Town of Grecnburgh v. Bd. of Super-
visors of Westchester County, 49 N.Y. Misc. 2d 116, 266 N.YS.2d 993 (Sup. CL 196); 51
N.Y. Misc. 2d 168, 272 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 53 N.Y. Misc. 2d 88, 277 N.Y.S.2.d 885
(sup. Ct. 1967); 55 N.Y. Misc. 2d 1031, 287 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1968); unreported de-
cision of Supreme Court, Westchester County, August 23, 1967; unreported decision of
Supreme Court, Westchester County, May 21, 1968, afj'd 30 App. Div. 2d 703, 292 N.YS.2d
334 (1968); 57 N.Y. Misc. 2d 1008, 293 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1963), reu'd with instructions
to vacate as moot, 23 N.Y.2d 732, 296 N.Y.S.2d 373, 244 N.E.2d 63 (1969).
7. "Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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the outcome of an election or that all voters should benefit equally
from the services of their representatives, or both.
The Court stressed the first rationale when it spoke in Gray v. San-
ders of protecting citizens from the debasement or dilution of their
vote.8 Reynolds v. Sims, however, seemed to emphasize both rationales
when it included, under the formula of "equal representation for
equal numbers of people," the right of all citizens both to have their
votes weighted equally and to be equally represented in the legisla-
ture.9
In Reynolds, as in most of the reapportionment cases to reach the
Supreme Court, the legislature was composed of single-member dis-
tricts whose representatives cast one vote.10 In these cases, the facts did
not force the Court to clarify the ambiguity; requiring that equal
weight be given to the vote of each citizen was tantamount to ensuring
equal representation for each citizen in the legislature.
The Court maintained a strict requirement by demanding that the
districts be "as nearly of equal population as is practicable."" It com-
pelled redistricting even in a case where the greatest disparity in pop-
ulation between districts was under six per cent, and refused in prin-
ciple to set tolerance limits within which deviations from "precise
mathematical equality" would be considered de minimis, saying that
"to consider a certain range of variances de minimis would encourage
legislators to strive for that range rather than for equality as nearly as
practicable.' 2
The Court has said in dicta that deviations will be permitted when
they are unavoidable or justifiable by the state, but it has suggested
that it would find unavoidable only those which result when the most
recent Census is out-of-date.' 3 It has never held a deviation justifiable,
even for reasons of geographical compactness, existing political boun-
daries, or economic or historic interests. 14 By making the requirement
so strict, the Court has caused each legislature with single-member dis-
tricts whose representatives cast one vote to undergo redistricting, both
immediately, and, presumably, after each future Census. To avoid
8. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
9. 377 U.S. 538, 560-61, 576 (1964).
10. E.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 894 U.S, 526
(1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), re-affirmed in Kirkpatrick v. Prieder, 894
U.S. 526 (1969).
12. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
13. Id. at 535. Cf. id. at 536-41 (Fortas, J., concurring).
14. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatnick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969).
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this shuffle of boundaries, legislators have devised alternative plans
which test the Court's ambiguous position about equal representation.
With one set of plans, they have varied the number of representatives
per district, using multi-member, at-large or floterial districts.a With
the other, they have varied the number of votes per representative,
using weighted or fractional voting.'0 The first set at least prevents the
initial redistricting from drastically disrupting the present system; the
second eliminates altogether the need to redistrict.17
The Court in Reynolds, referring specifically to multi-member dis-
tricts,'8 indicated that the first set of alternatives might be held con-
stitutional. Although later cases continued to speak of districts of equal
population as the goal,'9 the Court has recently upheld the use of
multi-member districts in the state legislatures of Georgia and Hawaii,
despite the charge that they permit political minorities to be sub-
merged.20 The principle embodied in these cases is still that all voters
must have an equal chance to determine the outcome of an election,2
although its application is more complicated than in cases of single-
member districts. The Court allows more representatives per district,
15. For a concise description of the various plans, see Weinstein, The Effect of Federal
Reapportionmnt Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65
CoLum. L. Rav. 21, 4041, 47 n.105 (1965). A floterial district has been defined as a "legis-
lative district which includes within its boundaries several separate districts or political
subdivisions which independently would not be entitled to additional representation
but whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to another seat in the par-
ticular legislative body being apportioned." Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 636 n.2 (196).
See also R. DIXON, DFssfocRAinc , REPREsENTATION, 461, 508-12 (196S).
16. See generally Weinstein, supra note 15, at 41-46; DIXON, supra note 15, at 516-.20.
17. This follows from the irrefutable assumption that it is possible to divide votes,
but not people. For example, if two single-member districts begin with ten thousand
voters and one vote per representative each, and the population of one district increases
by half, weighted voting can compensate precisely by granting its representative 1.5 votes.
With a multi-member system, the allocation cannot be made precise without redistricting.
whether or not another representative is added, the system will either under- or over-
represent the larger district by one-third. It would be possible to achieve precision by
multiplying the ratio of the districts' populations until it can be expressed in vhole
numbers, and according each district a corresponding number of representatives (here,
three and two), but in all except the simplest situations, such a procedure would stly
enlarge the size of the legislature.
18. "One body [of a bicameral legislature] could be composed of single-member dis-
tricts while the other could have at least some multimember districts." 377 U.S. at 577.
19. "The overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the
various districts," 377 U.S. at 579, quoted with approval in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 US.
433, 436 (1965). See also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) ('the 'as nearly
as practicable' standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality'); Avery v. 'Midland County, 390 US. 474, 484-85 (1907) ('We hold
today . . .that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from cqual population
in drawing districts .. -').
20. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (Hawaii); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433(1965) (Georgia). The Court in each instance refused to consider claims of possible
nullification of the voting strength of large minority groups, classifying such charges, in
the absence of clear factual proof, as "highly hypothetical assertions.' 379 US. at 437.
21. See p. 312 supra.
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but only if all districts have the same ratio of representatives to pop-
ulation. So, a district with three representatives will be allowed so long
as it has precisely three times the population of the single-member
district, since a one-third chance of electing three representatives is
the equivalent of one chance of electing one.
The only Supreme Court decision on floterial districts affirmed a
district court order compelling reapportionment, by reference to the
same principle.22 The plan was held invalid because the floterial district
was composed of a large district which elected three representatives of
its own plus a county one-seventh its size which elected none, and thus
the voters in the county had a smaller chance of electing a legislator
than those in other districts. 23 Presumably, had the districts been of
equal size and the ratio of representatives to population in the entire
floterial district been the same as the ratio outside the district, the plan
would have been upheld.2 4
The Court has indicated that both multimember and floterial dis-
tricts are acceptable as long as each citizen has an equal chance of elect-
ing a legislator. Multimember and floterial districts are not equivalent
to single-member districts, however; in neither case does providing
each citizen an equal chance of electing a legislator ensure that he
is equally represented in the legislature. Where there are districts of
different sizes, the representation is likely to be of different quality; the
multimember or floterial representative is more likely to represent
broader interests than those of his local constituency. The Court has
upheld these plans without discussing the question of representation.
Weighted voting plans present the question of representation
squarely. To uphold them, the Court must find that the equal repre-
sentation requirement in Reynolds is critical. Presumably, the Court
would do that; even if a legislature were composed of single-member
districts of precisely equal population, it would be held unconstitu-
tional if the legislators were given different numbers of votes.
Beyond that, the Court must find that the equal representation re-
quirement is the only requirement in Reynolds. It is clear that weighted
voting plans do not give voters an equal chance of electing a legislator.
22. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
23. There are many variations for floterial districts, of which this is only the simplest.
The floterial district might have been upheld had the votes of the county's citizens for
the floterial representative been weighted seven times the votes of the dtizens of the
large district.
24. Since the total number of representatives inside the floterial district is four-three
from the larger district and one from the floterial district-the population of the large
district plus the small county must be four times the population of a singlemember
district.
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Should they be held constitutional, it must be because they ensure to
each citizen equal representation in the legislature.
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo 25 is the only weighted voting case to reach
the Supreme Court, and its precedential value is dubious. The Court
originally affirmed a district court decision which struck down a plan
because it did not ensure the citizens equal representation, but it sub-
sequently vacated the case as moot after the state adopted an acceptable
districting plan.
IL'
Weighted voting is the system of representation in which districts
of unequal population send to a legislature representatives with cor-
responding inequalities in the number of their votes;20 if the repre-
sentative from a district with five thousand people has one vote, the
representative from a district with ten thousand has two. The assump-
tion is that giving the representative from the larger district tvice as
much voting power in the legislature precisely compensates for giving
the voter in the larger district one half the influence in electing his
representative, so that each voter has an equal influence upon legisla-
tive decisions.2 7
John Banzhaf III has outlined in three articles a refinement of
weighted voting derived from probability theory.28 Banzhaf shares the
assumption underlying traditional weighted voting that inequalities
in the population of districts can be offset precisely by inequalities in
25. 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated as moot,
384 U.S. 887 (1966).
26. Strictly speaking, a body composed of representatives from districts of equal pop-
ulation may be said to employ weighted voting, since the ratio of one legislators vote to
another's (1:1) is proportionate to the ratio of the population of their districts (p:p). In
this Note, however, "weighted voting" refers to a system in which some representatives
cast more votes than others.
27. In more mathematical terms:
(a) In any legislature in which each representative casts one vote, the weight of each
constituent's vote, as compared to a vote in another district, can be expressed as the
reciprocal of the population ratio between the two districts. If the districts are of unequal
population, constituents' votes will differ in value. For example, a single vote in a district
of thirty thousand will be worth one-third as much as a vote in a district of ten thousand.
(b) The inequality in vote weight can be precisely compensated by granting each
representative a number of votes inversely proportional to the relative voting power of
his constituents. In the example, this would give to the legislator representing thirty
thousand three times as many votes as given his companion repraenting ten thousand.
See Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rur. I Rnv.
317, 323 (1965).
28. Banzhaf, One Man, ? Votes. Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective
Representation, 36 Gao. WAsm L. Ray. 808 (1968); Banzhaf, Multi.Member Electoral
Districts--Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309
(1966); Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RuT. L
Ray. 317 (1965). See also Brief for John Banzhaf III as Amicus Curiae, lannuce v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 282 N.YS.2d 502, 229 N.E2d 195 (1967).
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the voting power of their representatives. 2 He distinguishes his system
from the traditional one by redefining voting power as the relative
frequency of a representative's ability to cast the decisive vote, rather
than the simple ratio of his number of votes to the total number of
votes in the legislature.30
More basically, Banzhaf objects to the traditional system because it
has a strong bias in favor of the larger district.31 This can best be seen
in the extreme case, where a district contains over 50% of the popula-
tion. A traditional weighted voting system would accord its representa-
tive over 50% of the votes, so he alone would determine the outcome
of every vote. In a similar way, it favors every large district relative to
smaller ones.
Given a certain allocation of votes among legislators, Banzhaf uses
the following procedure to compute voting power.3 2 A tabulation is
made of every possible combination of yes-or-no votes by the repre-
sentatives. When the votes are totaled and outcomes determined for
each combination, a tabulation is made for each representative of the
number of winning combinations in which he participated, where his
vote equaled more than half the margin of victory. The frequency
with which he cast this decisive vote determines his voting power. This
figure can be brought into alignment with the proportionate size of his
constituency by changing the number of votes originally allotted.39
29. 75 YALE L.J. 1309, supra note 28, at 1315.
30. 19 RUT. L. Rav. 317, supra note 28, at 328-35.
31. With minor exceptions, such as the very small legislature, see note 33, infra.
32. 19 Rur. L. REv. 317, supra note 28, at 328-35.
33. The utility of Banzhaf's theory may be limited since it only tests allocations of
votes but cannot prescribe them. Banzhaf cannot tell us how many votes to give eact
representative to make voting power proportionate to population. The applicability of
Banzhaf's model is also circumscribed by the fact that it cannot be used for small
legislatures. If there are, as an extreme example, only three representatives, their voting
power must be in the ratio of 100%-0 ,-0%, 60%-20%-20% or 3V17A3/%.31/3%s 31S%.
This is true because in a three-man body, there exist only three possible categories of
sets of winning combinations: (1) One member has over half the votes, and therefore casts
the only decisive vote and has all the voting power; (2) Any combination of two members
can win, so each member has equal voting power. This can be illustrated by the following
chart, in which A, B and C denote representatives with one vote each:
Possible Combinations Ability to Affect Outcome
Voter A B C Vote A B C
N N N 0-3
N N Y 1-2 X X
N Y N 1-2 X X
N Y Y 2-I X X
Y N N 1-2 X X
Y N Y 2-1 X X
Y Y N 2-1 X X
Y Y Y 3-0
Total: 4 4 4
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The New York courts, which have been the primary battleground
for the issues of weighted voting, have shown considerable sympathy
for Banzhaf's ideas. The leading case, lannucci v. Board of Supervisors
of Washington County,34 recognized the validity of Banzhaf's math-
ematical analysis and elevated it to the rank of a legal test. Holding
the weighted voting plans of two county boards of supervisors uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that residents of the larger districts were
overrepresented, the Court of Appeals ruled that "it should be math-
ematically possible for every member of the legislative body to cast a
decisive vote on legislation in the same ratio which the population
of his constituency bears to the total population."3 5
Two other mathematicians, Lloyd Shapley and Irwin Mann, have
proposed an alternate theory30 which appears more accurate than
Banzhaf's but which has not received attention in the courts. Reason-
ing that legislators cast their votes successively, as in a roll call, Shapley
and Mann, unlike Banzhaf, incorporate into their model the order in
which votes are cast. Instead of taking every possible combination of
yes and no votes, and giving credit only to those who cast a number
of votes for the winning side which is more than half the winning
margin, Shapley and Mann take every possible permutation of voting
Since each legislator can affect the outcome as often as can his colleagues, their voting
power is equal. Now, assume that A and B each cast ten votes, but C only one. This
should, one would at first assume, give A and B each ten times as much power to affect
outcomes as C has. A Banzhavian table, however, will reveal that nothing has changed.
The voting power of all representatives remains equal, because it still takes a combination
of two members to pass legislation, and it does not matter whether the outcome is 11-10
or 20-1. (3) One member has a number of votes exactly equal to the total of his two
colleagues. In this configuration, the largest member will always posses three times as
much voting power as each of the others.
A(4 votes) B(3) C(l) Vote A B C
N N N 0-8
N N Y 1-7 X
N Y N 3-5 X
N Y Y 4-40 X
Y N N 4-40 % X
Y N Y 5-3 X X
Y Y N 7-1 X X
y Y Y 8-0 X
Total: 6 2 2
* In a tie vote, since the measure is defeated, only those voting No can affect the out-
come by switching their vote. If the three districts have equal populations, Banhars
system is unnecessary. If they do not, unless their populations are in the ratio of 60-10-20,
the system cannot allocate voting power in exact proportion to population.
34. 20 N.Y.2d 244, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 229 N.E.d 195 (1967).
35. Id. at 252, N.Y.S.2d at 508, 229 N.E.2d at 199.
36. Mann and Shapley, The a priori voting strength of the electoral college, in GAME
THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES To SociuL BEHAViORp 151 (H. Shubik ed. 1964). Cf.
Shapley and Shubik, A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee
system, id. at 141, 48 Aw. POL. Sc. REv. 787 (1954).
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sequences, assume that in each sequence the votes are cast the same
way, and give credit to the pivotal voter-the last member of the
winning minimum coalition.
In either Shapley and Mann's or Banzhaf's system, if the representa-
tive of a small district is allotted one vote, the representative of a larger
district will always be allotted a number of votes somewhere between
a lower limit of one and an upper limit of the population ratio of the
larger to the smaller district. Since this population ratio determines the
number of votes allotted in a traditional weighted voting system,
Banzhaf and Shapley will make a smaller allotment in nearly every
case.
In turn, Shapley's system seems to allot a smaller number of votes
to the larger district than Banzhaf's, but while there is a consistent
difference, it is very small, and the two systems are, for practical pur-
poses, identical. Though each of the systems is distinct, Banzhaf,
Shapley and Mann, and traditional weighted voting plans share the
fundamental advantage of eliminating entirely the need for redistrict-
ing. The only change required when the population shifts is a read-
justment of the number of votes given the representatives.
This advantage is peculiar to weighted voting. If two districts in a
legislature each have 10,000 voters, and the population of one increases
by 7,000, a system of single member districts requires a new district,
with 1,000 voters taken away from each of the old districts. Multi-
member districts simplify the process somewhat by requiring only that
1,000 voters be moved from the stable to the expanded district. But
with weighted voting, the number of votes given to the representative
of the expanded district is simply changed from 1 to 1.7.
III.
Banzhaf and Shapley are unquestionably correct in their belief that
the traditional weighted voting system contains a mathematical defect
which causes it to overrepresent larger districts; in contrast, their sys-
tems seem mathematically impeccable. There is a non-mathematical
defect, however, inherent in all weighted voting systems. In defining
legislative power solely in terms of ability of the legislator to affect out-
comes by voting, they take an extremely restrictive view of the repre-
sentative's function. They take into account no representative activity
other than the casting of a vote.87
37. The only theoretical difference between traditional and refined weighted voting
is the attempt by the latter to equalize voting power more accurately. Both syatemt ex-
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Even on the floor of the legislature, representatives perform many
important functions besides voting.38 They introduce proposals, amend
those presented by others, participate in debate, and attempt to per-
suade their colleagues. Before a bill reaches the floor, they attend party
caucuses and committee hearings to prepare and draft legislation. Out-
side the legislature altogether, they gather information and consult
party leaders, lobbyists and constituents to ascertain their views on
particular proposals.
Much of a legislator's time, however, is spent doing work unrelated
to formulating or examining bills. Besides acting as an office admin-
istrator, he must provide a constant flow of services to his constituents,
dispensing favors and informing and educating his voters. These non-
legislative tasks, in fact, often require a much greater portion of the
representative's time and energy than his legislative tasks.9
Even if there were not a bias, the Court should not sustain a weighted
voting system. Singe-member and multi-member districts accurately
provide equality of representation in non-voting functions. Weighted
voting systems, on the other hand, fail to incorporate non-voting func-
tions because they cannot be precisely quantified. 0 As a result, the
Court must remain at best uncertain whether it is allowing deviations
from equality of representation.
After a closer look at the nature of non-voting functions, the Court
may be certain that a weighted voting system does produce deviations.
While the non-voting functions cannot be precisely quantified, the
effectiveness with which they are performed certainly affects the quality
of representation afforded to constituents. Most of the non-voting func-
tions involve personal services which cannot be delegated; so, the con-
straint on their performance is one of time. Since two men have twice
as much time as one, they can participate in twice as many legislative
committee hearings, debates on the floor, and reports to their con-
stitutents.&4 They might not be twice as effective, if the single repre-
sentative were from a larger district and, under a weighted voting
dude from consideration all non-voting activities. Banzhaf concedes that his model does
not provide an analysis of all the factors comprising effective representation; he admits a
broader approach will be necessary if the courts are to look beyond population, as it is
urged here they must. 75 YAr. LJ. 1309, supra note 28, at 1338.
38. AVMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 228 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
39. Morris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 50 N.Y. Misc. 2d 929, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
See, e.g., C. Clapp, THE CONGRESSMAN: His WoRr AS HE SEES IT, 50 et. seq., 10-4-27 (1963);
Dexter, The Job of the Congressman, READINGs IN AmEmCAq PotTic.AL BEuvra 5-26(R.E. Wolfinger, ed. 1966) S. Bailey and H. Samuel, CONGREsS AT WORE 96 et. seq. (1952).
40. New York Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment. Report, Legirs Doc.
No. 76 (1964) at 36.
41. 1W6MCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
319
The Yale Law Journal
plan, were given more votes. While increasing a legislator's votes may,
to some extent, increase the effectiveness of his non-voting activities,
this effect could not balance the bias.42 This is apparent when the
disparity in population between districts is great. The representative
from a district nine times the size of another district will not be nine
times as effective at non-voting functions even if, under a traditional
system, he has nine times the number of votes, and certainly not under
a Banzhaf or Shapley system, when he has only three times the number
of votes. Assuming that the increase in effectiveness is the same with
the increase of each vote, there will be an imbalance even when the
disparity between districts is small. Weighted voting systems, because
they allot no more representatives to larger districts than to smaller
ones, have a consistent bias in favor of the smaller district.
In view of this consistent bias against larger districts, all weighted
voting plans-even those of Banzhaf and Shapley, which allocate voting
power precisely according to population-should be held unconstitu-
tional. It was for precisely this reason that the district court in IYMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo invalidated two traditional weighted voting pro-
posals.43
Nor can the proponents of traditional weighted voting, having been
proven by Banzhaf and Shapley to favor larger districts consistently,
claim that their bias precisely offsets the opposite bias in non-voting
functions, for their voting bias is too gross. Again, the best example
to demonstrate this is the limit case, in which a representative from
a district containing over one-half the total population is given over
half the total votes. Since that representative has all the voting power,
no opposite imbalance of non-voting power could sufficiently com-
pensate.
This illustration is part of a broader argument which can be stated
in terms of mathematical functions. The assumption that non-voting
activities can be performed twice as well by two men as by one means
that the slope of a function representing the decrease in effectiveness
of non-voting activities of a single representative per increase in pop-
ulation would be plotted as a straight line. On the other hand, Banzhaf
and Shapley have demonstrated that the slope of the increase in the
voting effectiveness of a single representative for the same increase
in population would be a sharp curve. As a result, whatever the relative
42. Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 209 (ED. La. 1966) (dicta).
43. 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated as moot, 384 U.S. 887
(1966).
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value of voting and non-voting activities, the two functions cannot
balance consistently, since their slopes are different. Traditional
weighted voting cannot be salvaged by a fortuitous counterbalance
of voting and non-voting power.
Each weighted voting system, because it takes into account only the
quantifiable aspects of representation and therefore neglects the non-
voting functions, fails to provide equality of representation. Banzhaf
and Shapley do equalize voting, but retain consistent inequalities in
non-voting functions; traditional weighted voting allocates both ac-
tivities improperly, and cannot balance the two.
To accept weighted voting plans, the Court would have to accept
the second of the Reynolds policies, to the exclusion of the first; i.e.,
to require that each voter have equal representation in the legislature,
rather than an equal chance to determine the outcome of an election.
Weighted voting plans, however, admittedly failing the first test, also
fail the second. Equal representation in the legislature means more than
equal votes in the legislature, and also more than an equal chance of
affecting outcomes by votes in the legislature. The Supreme Court, if
it looks at all the aspects of representation, must hold any weighted
voting plan unconstitutional, since it fails both of the requirements of
Reynolds.
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